INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in the reliability and availability of broadband Internet connections have allowed technology users to store vast amounts of data remotely. 2 Cloud services now commonly sync photos, videos, emails, contacts, and other documents across multiple devices. Our craving for ubiquitous access to data, however, is not without limitation. At the forefront of the debate surrounding these services are concerns about privacy and security. 3 The thought of a third party gaining access to our private data is understandably troubling. Yet, these concerns frequently overlook the possibility that our digital life may become collateral damage in the course of a criminal investigation. Such digital asset seizures are becoming increasingly prevalent 4 as the Obama administration increases its use of existing civil forfeiture laws in an effort to deter cybercrime. , 6 a federal statute, which increases both civil and criminal penalties for copyright infringement. 7 Part III analyzes two notable criminal prosecutions, and distinguishes them from cases that do not involve digital assets. 8 Part IV argues government seizures of digital assets may implicate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. Finally, Part V concludes by finding that digital asset forfeitures constitute Fifth Amendment takings.
I. FEDERAL FORFEITURE
Asset forfeiture laws allow the government to permanently deprive an owner of his or her property rights when either the property itself has been used as "an instrumentality of crime," or "the owner of the property has been involved in a criminal activity."
9 Forfeiture is a method by which the government can, without compensation, take title to, or possession over property that has been tainted by a crime. 10 During civil asset forfeitures, this process may take place entirely outside of or without a criminal prosecution.
11
Civil asset forfeitures operate in rem and are based upon a theory that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing.
12 Accordingly, the civil forfeiture has become a powerful tool for law enforcement agencies and allows the government to take private property without paying compensation, but does not correspondingly impose the burden of proving an owner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 13 In the United States, no single statute grants the government general authority to seek civil forfeiture of property gained from, or otherwise involved in, the commission of crime.
14 Instead, statutes for specific criminal offenses must allow for asset forfeitures.
15

A. Our Turbulent History of Zero Tolerance
In his first State of the Union address, Richard Nixon famously promised to win the "war against crime."
16 The President called on Congress to pass legislation that would give law enforcement agencies "new and stronger weapons" to eliminate street-level crime. 17 Later that year, Congress enacted the first federal statutes to specifically include asset forfeiture provisions. 18 The first of these statutes, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970 (hereinafter "RICO") allows for forfeiture of assets connected to racketeering and organized crime. 19 The second statute, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (hereinafter the "CDAPCA"), permits forfeiture of assets connected to violations of the Controlled Substances Act. 20 State enactment of comparable statutes soon followed. 21 Nixon's vehement rhetoric continued to intensify until his presidency came to an abrupt conclusion in 1974.
22
Just eight years after its enactment, the CDAPCA was amended to include broader categories of property that could be forfeited to the government. 23 Through this Amendment, Congress gave federal law enforcement officers the power to seek forfeiture of: "all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of 14 Id. 15 Id. 
B. Use and Abuse
The list of reported abuses of this formidable tool is far too lengthy to detail fully. 27 Some of the more notable stories are, nevertheless, illustrative. One recent example occurred in Texas, when Jennifer Boatright was taken into custody, along with her two sons, while on the way to purchase a used car. 28 According to police, Boatright, a Latina, fit the profile of a drug courier. 29 Although no drugs were found in the vehicle, the local district attorney presented Boatright with two options, she could be prosecuted for money laundering and child endangerment, or she could agree to forfeit the cash officers had found in her vehicle. 30 Boatright signed her hard-earned savings over to the city, and in return no criminal charges were filed. 31 In another comparable example from a case in Philadelphia, police sought forfeiture of the home of Mary and Leon Adams after their adult son was accused of selling $20 worth of marijuana to a confidential informant on the couple's front porch. 32 Stories like these share one commonality, the displacement of traditional principles of due process, which are fundamental to the American justice system.
In response to widespread criticism of civil asset forfeitures, Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (hereinafter "CAFRA"). 33 CAFRA prevents government agents from forfeiting assets on the basis of probable cause. 34 Under CAFRA, before the government is permitted to seize assets, the government must specifically demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that there is a 24 Id. substantial connection between the crime and the property. 35 CAFRA also authorizes the appointment of counsel for any person who has standing to contest a civil forfeiture, but who is unable to afford private representation.
36
Perhaps the most important reform within CAFRA, is the creation of an innocent owner defense. 37 When the innocent owner defense, which is an affirmative defense, is applicable, an innocent third party's ownership interest in property will not be forfeited. 38 The burden is on the innocent party to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she either (1) "did not know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture," or (2) "did all that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such use of the property."
39 Courts are split in their application of this defense, which often requires a largely subjective "reasonableness" determination. 40 As a result, over 80% of all forfeitures still go uncontested even after CAFRA's enactment. 41 In fact, as demonstrated by Jennifer Boatright's, many innocent individuals often refrain from challenging a forfeiture because they are afraid doing so will lead to criminal charges.
42
Even though CAFRA provides individuals with a way to challenge forfeitures federally, CAFRA does nothing to inhibit individual states from engaging in civil asset forfeitures. 43 States are therefore permitted to enact their own forfeiture laws, which can be either more stringent or more lenient than CAFRA. In Pennsylvania, for example, asset forfeiture laws are comparable to their federal counterparts and do not provide any more leniency in asset forfeiture. 44 When grading states' forfeiture laws, the Institute for Justice specifically gave the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania a "D." 45 This grade came in large part from the fact that even though 35 See id. § 983(c) (2012). 36 Id. § 983(b)(1).
37 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012). 38 Id. § 983(d)(1). 39 
Id. § 983(d)(2)
. 40 See generally Cassella, supra note 10. 41 Id. at 12, 72 (explaining that contested civil forfeitures "provide the government with greater discovery tools and afford the government a right to depose and otherwise take broad civil discovery."). 42 See 18 U.S.C. § 1983(a)(3) (2012) (explaining that when an administrative forfeiture is contested the government may either bring a civil forfeiture or a criminal forfeiture). 43 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 44 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § § 6801-6802 (2012). Pennsylvania's statute provides an all-encompassing grant of authority for asset forfeiture, some trial courts have shown principled restraint in engaging in forfeitures, while some police officials have not.
46 Allegheny County trial courts, for instance, exercised sufficient restraint whereby the policy was "we had to have a [criminal] conviction and it had to make some reasonable sense why we were going after forfeiture." 47 Alternatively, police departments such as the Pittsburgh Police have exceeded the encompassing grant of authority involving asset forfeitures. 48 Recent audits have revealed that the Pittsburgh Police Department has routinely failed to comply with the statutory requirement that forfeiture funds be used only for narcotics-related investigations. 49 This evidenced by one particularly egregious instance where in 2009, the Pittsburgh Police Department spent approximately $10,000 of forfeited funds on Gatorade. 50 Similarly, over $4,000 of forfeited funds were used to send three bureau employees to Miami in 2012. 52 Content rights-holders such as the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") and the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") staunchly supported the legislation. 53 The PRO-IP Act amended existing copyright law to specifically include civil and criminal forfeiture provisions. 54 Under the PRO-IP Act, the Department of Justice's forfeiture authority may be invoked when county's president judge ordered that forfeitures involving criminal matters be handled in criminal court"). 46 Thompson, supra note 27. 47 
Id.
48 Liz Navratil, Pittsburgh police misuse of drug fund cited, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 13, 2013, http://www.post-gazette.com/neighborhoods-city/2013/03/13/Pittsburgh-police-misuseof-drug-fund-cited/stories/201303130150. 49 Id. 50 Id. 51 Id. the underlying crime is one of copyright infringement, trademark infringement, or misappropriation of trade secrets.
55
The PRO-IP Act specifically allows for civil forfeiture of (1) any prohibited articles, (2) property used or intended to be used "to commit or facilitate the commission of an offense," and (3) "[a]ny property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of an offense referred to in subparagraph (A)."
56 The PRO-IP Act's forfeiture provision, however, was not a unique creation of the legislature. Rather, PRO-IP Act incorporated the statutory language used in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (including subsequent amendments) by reference.
57
Armed with this new enforcement authority, a newly-created IP task force within the Department of Homeland Security got to work seizing website domain names. 58 On June 30, 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") unveiled a new program to respond to counterfeiting and piracy on the Internet. 59 The program began with the seizure of ten websites, which were distributing newly released movies. 60 As time passed, the government's appetite for seizing domain names swelled. "Operation Fake Sweep" yielded the seizure of 307 websites that had allegedly distributed counterfeit NFL merchandise.
61 "Project Bitter Pill" led to the seizure of 686 websites purportedly selling counterfeit medications. 64 The FBI, working in tandem with various international agencies, executed more than twenty search warrants across nine countries throughout the investigation. 65 Megaupload's servers were seized along with eighteen associated domain names and approximately $50 million in assets. 66 According to the subsequently unsealed grand jury indictment, the government sought forfeiture of among other things a Lamborghini LM002, a Rolls-Royce Phantom, a Maserati GranCabrio, 60 Dell servers, and dozens of international bank accounts. 67 Each of the seven defendants, including the aptly named CEO Kim Dotcom, were charged with conspiracy to commit racketeering, conspiracy to commit copyright infringement, and two counts of criminal copyright infringement. 68 Because copyright infringement is one that allows for civil forfeiture, forfeiture was allowed in this case. 69 Noticeably absent from the indictment is any reference to the noninfringing content stored on Megaupload's servers. 70 In fact, the government almost certainly has no intention to "use" such files, which were stored at the direction of third party users, in its prosecution. While the FBI may not have deliberately seized the data of every single Megaupload user, their stored files nevertheless became collateral damage in the sweep. Even legitimate users are prevented from accessing their stored data due to the FBI's seizure of Megaupload's domain names. One is example is that of Kyle Goodwin, a former Megaupload customer, who used the service to store videos of high school sporting events. 71 Goodwin's small business used Megaupload to store and distribute these video files. 72 After the FBI's seizure, Goodwin filed a motion in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking the return of his property. 73 According to Goodwin, his personal hard drive crashed just days before federal authorities shut down the service. 74 As a result, Goodwin's non-infringing video files are presently stored somewhere among the 25 million gigabytes of data rendered inaccessible by the actions of the United States Government. 75 The sheer magnitude of users and files, which have been implicated in the Megaupload seizure, aptly illustrates the dichotomy between the forfeiture of physical assets and the forfeiture of digital assets. This case also reveals that the CAFRA reforms are of limited benefit when digital assets are at issue. For example, although the Act requires that counsel be made available to indigent claimants, 76 aggrieved property owners such as Goodwin are unlikely to qualify. This is because Goodwin does not have an ownership interest in the seized property (Megaupload's domain names) and therefore does not have standing to challenge the forfeiture. 77 Civil forfeitures are a tool of convenience for law enforcement, allowing them to seize first and ask questions later. The burden is then placed on the owner of the property to come into court and contest the forfeiture. 78 This system is no longer practicable when digital assets are involved, because many Internet services have a user base that is geographically spread across multiple continents. Although our courts have clear jurisdictional limits, the Internet does not. Therefore, it is no longer rational to argue the government is justified in making broad seizures simply because innocent users may challenge them in a United States District Court. 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 Id. 75 
Id.
76 18 U.S.C. § 8983(b)(1) (2012). 77 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1) (2012). 78 See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 296 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Two years have passed since the initial Megaupload seizure and neither Goodwin nor any other user has been granted access to his or her non-infringing data. 79 Megaupload's hosting company has agreed to sell the leased servers to Megaupload for $1,000,000, but the government rejected the plan by refusing to unfreeze any of the company's assets. 80 The government continues to argue it is not financially or logistically able to return Goodwin's property, and Goodwin should seek other remedies. 81 Paradoxically, the government has requested a sealed ex parte order, which would allow them to share Megaupload's data with copyright industry groups such as the MPAA. 82 The government argues that such disclosure is necessary to ensure that copyright holders can bring civil lawsuits against Megaupload before the statute of limitations expires.
83
B. Silk Road
For over two years, an underground website allowed visitors from across the world to buy and sell illegal drugs as easily as purchasing a book on Amazon.com.
84 Silk Road's revenue surpassed $22 million in its first year of operation. 85 The FBI estimates that Ross Ulbricht, the website's alleged owner and operator, obtained over $80 Million in commissions throughout his tenure. 86 As a technical matter, Silk Road and its operators sold nothing. 87 81 
Id.
82 Masnick, supra note 79. 83 The position of the Department of Justice in this case seems to be that legitimate users are not entitled to the return of their data, but that Hollywood is entitled to a copy. See id. (providing a more thorough examination of the Government's position). 84 Andy Greenberg, Black Market Drug Site 'Silk Road' Booming: $22 Million In Annual Sales, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/08/06/blackmarket-drug-site-silk-road-booming-22-million-in-annual-mostly-illegal-sales. 85 Id. merely a marketplace, which connected buyers and sellers. 88 For Silk Road's trouble, they would retain a commission of 8-15% of the purchase price.
89
Even though Silk Road's business model was somewhat analogous to services like eBay and Craigslist, Silk Road's model was distinctive. 90 Unlike other services, Silk Road's home page was crowded with listings such as "10 x 10mg OxyContin" and "5G Pure Cocaine Cristal."
91 Silk Road was accessible only to visitors using Tor, a free piece of software that makes it theoretically impossible to trace a user's genuine identity. 92 Similarly, Silk Road did not accept credit cards, PayPal, or any other traditional forms of payment. 93 All Silk Road transactions were secured with a digital currency called Bitcoin. 94 Bitcoins are an anonymous, decentralized form of electronic currency that uses cryptography software to control their creation and transfer. 95 According to the FBI, Ulbricht made a series of calamitous slipups exposing his identity to federal agents who were, unsurprisingly, monitoring the site. 96 On October 1, 2013, Silk Road's walls came tumbling down. On that morning, the FBI took Ulbricht into custody at a public library in San Francisco. 97 Ulbricht was performing administrative maintenance on the site when agents moved in. 98 Critically, the FBI sought to detain Ulbricht before he could close his laptop thereby preventing the collection of valuable evidence. 99 Immediately after Ulbricht's arrest, visitors to the Silk Road website were no longer greeted with a 88 Sealed Verified Complaint, supra note 86, at 4. 89 
Id.
90 See Sealed Verified Complaint, supra note 86 (discussing the general nature of Silk Road's business). 91 Segal, supra note 87. 96 See Segal, supra note 87. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 
marketplace of mind altering substances, but were instead redirected to a FBI seizure notice.
100
The FBI seized all Bitcoins, which remained in Silk Road user accounts, as well as Ulbricht's personal stash of Bitcoins. 101 On October 13, 2013, the United States posted a notice of forfeiture on its website at www.forfeiture.gov. 102 Ulbricht subsequently filed a claim contesting the civil forfeiture of the Bitcoins found on his laptop. 103 Ulbricht's assertion is unsurprising considering the stockpile of Bitcoins seized has been valued at over $130 million. 104 Not a single person, however, was daring enough to claim an ownership interest in any portion of the $28 million, which had previously been held in individual user accounts on the Silk Road. 105 After District Judge J. Paul Oetken signed a final forfeiture order on January 15, 2014, the United States became the proud new owner of $28 million worth of allegedly tainted digital currency. 106 The law of civil asset forfeitures allowed the government to avoid the impossible task of identifying each and every Silk Road user and subsequently demonstrating criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt. 107 The government was largely able turn a blind eye to the actual owners of the $28 million because the Bitcoins were viewed as defendants. 108 The government's allegation that the funds were involved in a money laundering conspiracy was therefore sufficient to justify forfeiture. 109 This notion is a complex legal fiction designed to provide the means to an end. The forfeiture action essentially obscures its real impetus, preventing the purchase and sale of controlled substances on the Internet, 110 by pretending that the Bitcoins themselves were "an essential component" of Ulbricht's alleged money laundering conspiracy (a charge for which Ulbricht is presumed innocent). 111 The government's initial forfeiture complaint artfully refers to the goods and services offered on Silk Road as "overwhelmingly illegal." 112 The most in-depth analysis of the Silk Road ever conducted found that 955 items, or 3.9% of all listings, were categorized as "books." 113 These items are unlikely to constitute contraband. 114 More importantly, the First Amendment protects them. 115 Yet, the government did not trouble itself with distinguishing users who had purchased books from users who had purchased heroin. 116 The government simply seized all user funds without any further inquiry. 117 The Silk Road forfeiture is an excellent example of the power of our existing civil asset forfeiture regime.
The Silk Road forfeiture further demonstrates that the money laundering statute provides an effective means for federal prosecutors to forfeit assets, because it eliminates the need to distinguish between the portion of the property traceable to the underlying offense and the portion derived from other sources. 118 In fact, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York has joyfully conceded:
[w]e continue our efforts to take the profit out of crime and signal to those who would turn to the dark web for illicit activity that they have chosen the wrong path. . . . The Silk Road hidden website was designed to enable its users to buy and sell illegal drugs and other unlawful goods and services anonymously and beyond the reach of law enforcement.
119
The clash between reality and legal fiction is blatant in this statement. In the courtroom, the government forfeited these assets because they were an essential component of a money-laundering scheme. 120 In its press release, however, the Department of Justice openly congratulates itself for seizing $28 million from persons engaged in the purchase and sale of controlled substances via the Internet.
121
While the United States government should not be rebuked for its efforts to enforce the Controlled Substances Act, the fact that the government has accomplished its ends by sacrificing the rights of potentially innocent persons is concerning. Given that so many persons were impacted by the Silk Road's forfeiture, at least one innocent person had assets improperly forfeited. In fact, one individual, Peter Ward, a head shop owner from Devon, England, claims exactly that by asserting that his assets were seized even though he used Silk Road for exclusively legal transactions.
122 Unsurprisingly, Ward would like his profits returned to him, which total approximately $95,000. 123 Ward has even retained an attorney and hopes to delay the government's auction of his property. 124 If Kyle Goodwin's attempts to reclaim his data from Megaupload's servers are any indication, Ward's legal battle may prove to be the ultimate exercise in futility. Still, he remains optimistic and proclaims that "[i]t will be cool if an old hippy can throw a spanner in the big FBI machine." 123 Id. 124 Id.
125 Id. facility. 135 The government never initiated forfeiture proceedings against AmeriSource, nor did they introduce AmeriSource's drugs into evidence at the criminal trial that led to the convictions of Norfolk's principals. 136 Rather, the pharmaceuticals were held in storage and rendered worthless due to the passage of their expiration dates. 137 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected AmeriSource's contention that the government's decision to retain the drugs beyond the point of expiration constituted a taking.
138 Specifically, the court reasoned "[p]roperty seized and retained pursuant to the police power is not taken for a 'public use' in the context of the Takings Clause." 139 This reasoning is questionable in light of well-established Supreme Court precedent that broadly defines public use. 140 The court's attempt to draw a bright line between police power and public use is similarly dubious. 141 The Supreme Court has "long ago rejected any literal requirement that . . . property be put into use for the general public." 142 The Federal Circuit's contention that the valid exercise of a state's police power is not a "public use" also ignores the fact that regulatory takings have, on occasion, gone so far as to require just compensation. 143 Accordingly, AmeriSource Corp. should not be read to preclude the possibility that an overbroad cyber seizure may implicate the takings clause.
V. POLICY AND CONCLUSION
Treating digital asset forfeitures as Fifth Amendment takings would incentivize the government to act with a scalpel rather than a sword. Such an approach would ensure that seizures in cyberspace are conducted narrowly rather 135 Id. 136 Id. at 1151. 137 
Id.
138 AmeriSource, 525 F.3d at 1153. 139 
140 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power[]. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it."). 141 See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (holding that public use is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers"). 142 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. at 481-82 (quoting 467 U.S. at 235, 241-42, 244). 143 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
than carelessly. Broad seizures would only be executed when they could survive a cost-benefit analysis. While some critics may argue that this approach would unduly impede law enforcement, the logic of the law enforcement impediment argument rings hollow. As certain costs and benefits will always accompany criminal investigations, the question should not be what costs are associated with the criminal investigation, but whether those costs should be borne by a select number of innocent individuals or by the public as a whole. The current system is unfair to property owners and promotes the use of investigative tactics whose costs to the innocent far outweigh their benefits to the public. Just as the government must pay for land on which it builds courthouses and prisons, 144 it too should be required to pay for the property it destroys while investigating and prosecuting crime.
Once warned of the abuse that would follow from forfeiture schemes that bestowed upon the government virtually unlimited authority to seize private property, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen such application shall be made it will be time enough to pronounce upon it."
145 Surely that time has arrived when the government may deprive 60 million users of access to their own property or seize $28 million from persons whom it has not even identified. 146 These two cases illustrate the problematic nature of employing existing law enforcement tools in cyberspace. The problems that have plagued civil asset forfeiture since its inception have only become more evident as the government attempts to blur the line between physical and intangible property.
The rhetoric and policies of the 1970s were, and still remain, utterly counterproductive. Not only did these policies fail to accomplish their stated objectives, but also in the process ignited our tendency to pursue only penal solutions to social problems. Moderate reforms over the last decade have brought an end to a few of the imprudent policies. 147 By any objective measure, these
